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Abstract:   
 
Much contemporary analysis of world order rests on and reproduces a dualistic 
account of the international system, as divided into liberal and non-liberal spaces, 
practices and subjectivities. Drawing on postcolonial thought we challenge such 
dualisms in two ways. First, we argue that liberalism, as a specific form of 
governmental reason and practice produced at the intersection of the European and 
non-European worlds, has always been hybrid, encompassing within its project both 
‘liberal’ and ‘non-liberal’ spaces and practices. Second, through analysis of liberal 
engagement with diasporas, a specific set of subjects that occupy both these spaces, 
we show how contemporary practices of transnational security governance work to 
reproduce the hybridity of liberal peace. The article demonstrates the shifting 
conditions for local agency in relations and practices that transcend the simple 
dualism between liberal and non-liberal spaces, in the process showing how practices 
of transnational security governance also reproduce diasporas as hybrid subjects. The 
argument is illustrated with reference to the Tamil diaspora and the Sri Lankan state’s 
war against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. 
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Peter Burgess and three anonymous reviewers for comments and encouragement. 
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Despite the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, much security 
analysis continues to adopt a dualistic account of the international system as divided 
into two distinct parts. On one side are a set of liberal states, including leading 
members of the international community such as the United States and the European 
Union, comprising a pacific order built upon the principles of liberal democracy, 
market economics, and the rule of law. On the other side are a large number of non-
liberal states, many of them subject to instability, conflict and humanitarian crisis. 
The latter appear in policy practice and the scholarly research that informs it as 
peripheral to the liberal order at the core of the international system and as the major 
obstacle to its extension (e.g., Collier and Hoeffler, 2004). Although widespread in 
the literature, theoretically and empirically the separation of a peaceful liberal core 
from a violent and unstable non-liberal periphery is unsustainable (e.g., Barkawi and 
Laffey, 2001). The constitutive relations between liberal and non-liberal worlds are 
evident in contemporary security concerns about international migration (e.g., 
Adamson, 2006). The al-Qaeda attacks in New York, London and Madrid prompted 
greater awareness of ‘the presence within’ of dangerous non-liberal subjects and their 
potential for ‘extremism’ and ‘home grown’ terrorism; the periphery’s dangers were 
manifesting in the core. Indeed, even before the ‘global war on terror’ the presence in 
the liberal core of diasporas – migrant communities of people with continuing links to 
other ‘homelands’ (Clifford, 1994) – had already placed their members and practices 
on the international security agenda. Diasporas were linked to conflict, violence and 
insecurity in the periphery by a range of scholarly inquiries concerned with, for 
example, ‘long distance nationalism’ (Anderson, 1992), ‘external’ support for 
insurgencies (RAND, 2001), and networks of illicit trade, finance and migration. 
Consequently, diasporas have become targets, vehicles and bases for a range of 
security practices in ‘host’ states, ‘home’ states, and in between (e.g., Collyer, 2012).  
 
Analysis of the transnational security governance of diasporas highlights the ways in 
which ‘liberal’ and ‘non-liberal’ spaces, subjects and practices together participate in 
the reproduction of liberal order. Building on this observation, in this article we argue 
that liberal order (‘liberal peace’) is hybrid, which we equate provisionally with 
miscegenation. The origins of hybridity lie in critical analysis of colonialism, its 
forms and its aftermath, particularly in Latin America and South Asia (Young, 2001). 
In context hybridity, like diaspora, is best understood as a ‘struggle concept’: it both 
describes but also intervenes in social reality, with diverse consequences for social 
analysis and political effects (Hennessy, 1996:219-221; cf. Clifford, 1994:310-315). 
Hybridity is not inherently emancipatory however: it depends on the historical and 
social context within which the concept is deployed (e.g., Alonso, 2005). Recent 
scholarship on relations between liberal and non-liberal worlds renders hybridity as a 
problem-solving social scientific concept equated with mixing or interaction (e.g., 
Mac Ginty, 2011). In contrast, we deploy hybridity critically and strategically in order 
to demonstrate the miscegenated character of liberal order, and indeed of liberalism 
itself. From its inception liberal governmentality (e.g., Rose 1999) has encompassed 
both liberal and non-liberal subjects and spaces, in Europe and its imperial and 
colonial extensions, generating practices and apparatuses of rule which are also 
hybrid in nature. Articulating liberal order as hybrid enables us better to recognise the 
constitutive role of diverse ‘non-liberal’ practices within it.  
 
The hybridity of liberal order is reproduced in the transnational security governance 
of diasporas. Specifically, we show, first, how international security practices 
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constitute diasporas in specific ways. Security practices directed towards diasporas 
are not merely the sometimes excessive responses to self-evident threats and 
problems posed by diaspora activity for domestic order or foreign policy goals but 
rather part of a globe-spanning transformative project of generating pacific liberal 
order. It is in relation to producing ‘peace’ and ‘stability’ in distant conflict spaces 
that diasporas – refugees, migrants, asylum seekers and their descendents – find 
themselves on the international security agenda. Diaspora members may hold German 
or Canadian citizenship but they appear on the terrain of international security 
primarily in terms of their links to, and posited impact on, their homelands. 
According to the specialist literature they can be either ‘warmongers’, ‘peace 
builders’ or both (e.g., Østergaard-Nielsen, 2006; Smith and Stares, 2007; 
Pirkkalainen and Abdile, 2009; Brinkerhoff, 2011). Such research, aimed explicitly at 
solving perceived policy problems, generates specific international responses with 
significant effects. For instance, the complexity of diaspora members’ subjectivities 
and practices, including their social, economic and political connections to their 
homeland and its contestations, are effaced by the dichotomy – order/disorder – 
inherent to liberal peace. Second, and simultaneously, international security practices 
act on and through diasporas to advance liberal peace in the periphery. In that sense, 
diasporas are not always a problem but also useful assets (e.g., Shain, 1999). Taken 
together, these practices reproduce diaspora as hybrid subjects, with significant 
consequences for diaspora agency. Relations between host states and diaspora 
communities are determined by the shifting relations between international security 
practices and often unpredictable events in the latters’ homelands rather than, say, the 
rights and privileges of citizenship. Terrorism proscriptions, for example, shape 
diaspora activism, disciplining and silencing insurgent supporters (‘extremists’) and 
empowering their opponents (‘moderates’) and constituting what is, and isn’t, 
legitimate ‘civil society’ activity. Articulated through the characteristic political 
forms of liberal order, diaspora agency is conditioned and made possible through 
these shifting representations, relations and intersections. 
 
Foregrounding the constitutive and hierarchical relations between liberal and non-
liberal worlds, this article is a contribution to the postcolonial critique of security 
studies (e.g., Barkawi and Laffey, 2006). Specifically, we engage an object – diaspora 
– integral to the critique of models, theories and histories which privilege (a particular 
conception of) Western experience and nation-state framings of global time and 
space. As a translocal object of analysis, diaspora challenges efforts to draw sharp 
lines between liberal and non-liberal worlds, inviting engagement with subjects and 
practices situated simultaneously in both. Building on Suthaharan Nadarajah’s fifteen 
years as a participant observer of the Tamil diaspora, our ethnographically-grounded 
analysis invokes the everyday experience of the diaspora and the hybrid modes of 
subjectivity produced as it is variously engaged – at ‘home’ and ‘abroad’, officially 
and unofficially – by the institutions and practices of liberal peace. Thus, our focus on 
diaspora enables recovery of the entangled global histories and geographies through 
which security and insecurity are produced in a postcolonial world (Hönke and 
Müller, 2012). 
 
We develop our argument through analysis of the Tamil diaspora and the armed 
conflict between the Sri Lankan state and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam 
(LTTE), an exemplary case routinely cited in the literature. First, we elaborate an 
account of liberalism in the world as hybrid and clarify what we mean by this term. 
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Second, we outline Sri Lanka’s conflict and international interventions in it, and show 
how these illustrate the hybridity of liberal peace. Third, we consider post-Cold War 
liberal engagement with conflict zones and detail the ways in which diasporas have 
been represented in scholarship and engaged in policy practice. Fourth, we examine 
international security practices in relation to the Tamil diaspora before and after the 
end of Sri Lanka’s war and sketch the consequences for diaspora hybridity and 
agency. In a brief conclusion we summarise our argument and its implications. 
 
 
The hybridity of liberalism in the world 
 
Drawing on postcolonial thought, in this section we develop an account of liberalism 
in the world, and in particular the internal relationship between liberal peace and 
hybridity, with direct implications for how we understand the relations between 
states, diasporas and insecurity. Hybridity, a term closely associated with 
postcolonialism, has recently become something of a buzz-word among scholars 
working on liberal peace (e.g., Stamnes, 2010; Mac Ginty, 2011; Richmond, 2011). 
Owing to the ubiquity regularly noted by anthropologists and others, ‘the usefulness 
of indicating hybridity in particular instances’ requires justification, opening up the 
politics of such a move (Prabhu, 2007:14-15). The turn to hybridity stems from the 
failures of liberal democracy and neoliberal economic models as universal ‘one size 
fits all’ solutions to problems of conflict and instability. In response, scholars and 
policy analysts have argued for the adoption of hybrid models, in which a liberal 
international order is articulated with non-liberal indigenous institutions, norms and 
practices at the domestic level.  
 
While this represents a positive development in terms of the problem-solving 
rationale driving liberal peacebuilding, it is not unproblematic. First, such scholarship 
generally continues to treat the territorial state as the appropriate scale of analysis and 
so remains caught in the ‘territorial trap’ (Agnew, 1994). Hybridity is understood in 
shallow terms, as a domestic phenomenon referring to external relations with local 
communities deploying non-liberal forms of decision-making or conflict resolution. 
Second, and more significant for our purposes, hybridity is usually understood within 
this literature as a novel development in liberal peacebuilding, one that signals a 
newly positive engagement between liberal and non-liberal worlds (but cf. Hönke, 
2012). Failure to take seriously the necessity of a postcolonial perspective on world 
order and its making leads to an ahistorical understanding of liberalism and its forms 
of rule, despite occasional acknowledgement of past co-option by ‘external actors’ 
such as empires of ‘local violent practices for their own ends’ (Mac Ginty, 2011:64). 
Indirect rule under British colonialism for example was ‘a practice of government 
which worked through institutions that relied on what were thought to be indigenous 
customs and structures of authority’ (Hindess, 2005:253). The recent turn to hybridity 
is thus in fact quite limited and also misconstrues what liberal order means and how it 
is pursued across time and space.   
 
Liberal order has always been a hybrid social formation. Modernity in all its forms, 
liberal ones not the least, emerges at the intersection of Europe (or ‘the West’) and 
non-Europe, as a co-production of diverse peoples on either side of this divide (e.g., 
Bayly, 2004). Indeed, as Neumann and Sending note (2010:39), as a form of power 
specific to modernity that both constitutes and works through ‘society’, liberal 
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governmentality emerges as a hybrid of pastoral and sovereign ambitions, although 
they downplay the relations between liberal and non-liberal worlds we highlight here. 
By contrast we show how the advance of liberal governmentality is dependent on its 
‘translation’ (Rose, 1999:47-51) into the calculations and activities of both ‘liberal’ 
and ‘non-liberal’ subjects, in both core and periphery; in other words, how the 
exercise of sovereign, disciplinary and governmental powers through which liberal 
order is generated also works through quintessentially illiberal practices – as Rose 
observes, ‘even terror can be a calculated instrument of governance’ (1999:24). Thus, 
the close relations between liberal core and non-liberal periphery highlighted by the 
securitization of diasporas, and the diverse forms of rule within and across this divide, 
including violence and the use of force, are not new. The seemingly sharp division 
between liberal core and non-liberal periphery is in fact internal to the project of 
modernity: the production of the dualism lies in the very practices through which 
European and non-European peoples and places were tied together and is itself 
productive of these identities (e.g., Cooper and Stoler, 1997). Indeed, emerging as it 
did at the intersection of natural law tradition and the commercial and colonial 
expansion of the Dutch and English states in the seventeenth century, liberal 
governmentality has always been inseparable from practices often seen as antithetical 
to it, such as those of imperialism and militarism (cf. Pitts, 2005).  
 
Contrary to its self-understanding as a philosophy concerned essentially with intra-
state relations between the sovereign and the freedoms of the individual, liberalism 
has from the start been a governmental project concerned with ‘the regulation and re-
organisation of the international sphere’ (Hindess, 2004:24). The production across 
diverse populations and spaces of a liberal order incited and was shaped by diverse 
resistances and appropriations on the imperial frontier in which violence was often to 
the fore. Administrative apparatuses within the core and the periphery were complex 
products of imperial practice, developed in international circuits of colonial 
government, as well as indigenous elements and struggles (e.g., McCoy, 2009). The 
project of liberal order-making was never peaceful or complete, nor was it 
monolithic. Significantly there was no presumption that all peoples should be 
governed in precisely the same way. Liberal order has always rested on a 
governmental concern: ‘what can be governed through the promotion of liberty and 
what must be governed in other ways’ (Hindess, 2004:30; emphasis added). Liberal 
governmentality thus produces subjects and spaces governed differently within an 
overall rationality of rule. For us, this means liberal order must be seen as 
fundamentally hybrid in character.  
 
Hybridity can be defined in a variety of ways (e.g., Prabhu, 2007), but for us the key 
point is perhaps the miscegenated character of the liberal order, the ways in which it 
everywhere contains or is articulated with elements not well-captured through its own 
concepts and categories. As Wendy Brown observes, ‘liberalism is striated with 
nonliberal culture wherever it is institutionalised and practiced. Even in the texts of its 
most abstract analytic theorists, it is impure, hybridized, and fused to values, 
assumptions, and practices unaccounted by it and unaccountable within it’ (2006:23; 
cf. Latour, 1993). For example, nineteenth-century liberal order was constituted out 
of diverse articulations of various elements, some straightforwardly liberal in a 
traditional sense (e.g., ‘free trade’, ‘rule of law’) but others clearly not, such as 
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fraternal organizations with medieval rules … in treaty ports Shanghai 
and Calcutta; … New and old military units, some composed of native 
recruits, … decorated with medieval heraldry, medals and regalia, and 
claim[ing] the masculine chivalry of knights errant… Victoria the 
queen-empress of the British Empire, ruling over an Indian nobility 
retooled with European feudal nomenclature (Hevia, 2003:20-23). 
 
In other words, the production of force, trade and imperial authority within the 
nineteenth-century liberal order depended on a set of constitutive relations between 
liberal and non-liberal practices and institutions. Understood in this way, the 
hybridity of liberal order we want to highlight has similarities with Tani Barlow’s 
description of ‘colonial modernity’ as underlining ‘the constitutional doubleness of 
discourses of modernity’, not least through accentuating ‘the political and ideological 
dependency, or intellectual interrelatedness, of colonizing powers and colonial 
regimes’ (2005:376). Our articulation of liberal order as hybrid seeks to capture these 
elements. Specifically, it points to the always already ‘bastardized and adulterated’ 
character of identities and the categories enabling them (Krishna, 19999:xx) as well 
as the constitutive relations between differentiated practices of rule within and 
between the metropole and colonial or postcolonial spaces.  
 
The hybrid character of the liberal peace has been hard to see in part because of the 
tendency to take at face value liberal self-understandings which deny miscegenation. 
Michael Walzer aptly describes liberalism as practicing the art of separation: 
‘Liberalism is a world of walls…’ (1984:315). Thus, complex social formations – up 
to and including whole world orders – can be described as liberal while, 
simultaneously, practices demonstrably integral to those formations such as racism or 
colonial and imperial violence are asserted to be not liberal. Liberalism is abstracted 
from its local contexts and instantiations, presented instead as effectively timeless and 
placeless. In colonial and revolutionary situations, for example, where the close 
relations between liberalism and ostensibly non-liberal practices are particularly 
evident, liberalism in the shape of human rights becomes ‘paradoxical’ or ‘distorted’ 
(e.g., Bradley, 2007), thus preserving its essential character. But as Brown argues, 
‘[b]oth the autonomy and the universality of liberal principles are myths, crucial to 
liberalism’s reduction of questions about its imperial ambitions or practices to 
questions about whether forcing others to be free is consonant with liberal principles’ 
(2006:23). This discursive strategy has ideological effects: liberal order secures its 
status as essentially peaceful by publicly denying a set of relations and articulations – 
across the liberal/non-liberal divide – with practices that nevertheless are repeatedly 
and routinely linked with it, thereby obscuring the hybrid nature of liberalism in the 
world (cf. Latham, 1997).  
 
In terms of our argument about the relations between diasporas and security, the 
hybrid sets of practices on which the production of liberal peace rests – including 
persuasion, coercion, ‘empowerment’, violence and sometimes genocidal force – 
work on and through individuals and collectives in core and periphery. The complex 
resistance and acquiescence they invoke in turn produce hybrid subjects (on hybridity 
and subjectivity, see e.g., Hall, 1990). Within the contemporary world order, 
diasporas pursue their goals through their own sets of hybrid practices. For instance, 
diaspora Tamils may act as Western citizens lobbying ‘their’ political establishments, 
setting agendas informed by liberal tenets such as representative democracy and 
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individual freedoms, and organise themselves into actors such as the British Tamil 
Forum. But they may also act simultaneously as part of a distinct collective, the Tamil 
nation, on behalf of which they engage in politics. The diaspora includes both forms 
of subjectivity, in multiple and complex articulations. Liberal governmentality cannot 
advance its own conception of world order without appropriating, mobilising or 
dismantling these liberal, non-liberal, even illiberal assemblages. Accordingly it 
addresses diaspora Tamils in conflicting, even contradictory, ways, as good liberal 
subjects but also as problematic subjects of a distant ethnic homeland: ‘citizens’, ‘tax-
payers’, and ‘voters’ are also articulated as ‘extremist’ supporters, funders or even 
agents of ‘ethno-nationalism’ and violence. These competing articulations and the 
governmental practices they inform exist side-by-side and intersect within ‘host’ 
states, ‘home’ states and in between, helping to reproduce the Tamil diaspora – 
collectively and individually – as an internally complex and hybrid translocal subject. 
 
The hybrid character of liberal governmentality – as entailing not the homogenisation 
of rule but rather its differentiation across peoples and spaces – was evident in the 
Cold War world order, defined as it was by the diverse relations between a US-
dominated liberal core and a less peaceful ‘Free World’ periphery. After the 
establishment of the UN, liberal peace building was continuous throughout the 
period, reproducing and reinforcing the integral relations between the so-called zones 
of peace and war (e.g., Al-Qaq, 2009). Despite being revitalised by the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, the project of realising a pacific liberal order continued to be 
confronted by new or continuing forms of violent disorder within the states of the 
periphery. The identification of intra-state conflict as the leading problem for the 
international community (Mundy, 2011:279) swiftly engendered an expanding raft of 
interventionist practices informed by new research programs which grew into 
specialised scholarly fields - ‘conflict resolution’, ‘conflict transformation’, 
‘peacebuilding’, ‘peacekeeping’, ‘democratisation’, ‘security sector reform’ and so 
on. Ideological support for these efforts was further provided by the burgeoning 
literature on the democratic peace. These interventionist practices and their 
consequences are readily apparent in post-Cold War Sri Lanka, a former part of the 
‘free world’ to which we now turn. 
 
 
Sri Lanka’s conflict and the liberal peace: Logics and effects of intervention 
 
Post-Cold War international interventions approached Sri Lanka’s armed conflict as 
essentially a problem of ethno-nationalist separatism manifest in the LTTE’s armed 
struggle for an independent Tamil state (e.g. Wills, 2001). While Tamil ‘grievances’ 
against the Sinhala-dominated state were acknowledged, these were considered 
relatively easy to address through devolution of some powers to Tamil regions, 
reform of democratic and governance institutions, ‘reconciliation’ amongst the 
island’s communities and so on. The goal, long considered eminently feasible were it 
not for the armed conflict, was a united and inclusive liberal market democracy. The 
primary obstacle was, therefore, the LTTE’s armed struggle and ‘its’ secessionist 
project. While important aspects of the liberal peace agenda – especially economic 
liberalisation and development – had been pursued by bilateral and multi-lateral 
donors in Sri Lanka since the late seventies, international intervention in the conflict 
began forcefully in the mid nineties, in three phases: backing the state’s war against 
the LTTE up to 2001; supporting a Norwegian-led peace process, alongside 
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expanding the military, till 2006; and supporting the state’s resumed war till the 
defeat of the LTTE in 2009. Whilst recent interventions are increasingly aimed at 
disciplining the anti-liberal and Sinhala nationalist regime, until 2009 the state 
received determined international support as it pursued neoliberal restructuring, 
development, and counter-insurgency. What is important here is, firstly, how the 
production and maintenance of liberal order necessarily proceeds through the illiberal 
practices of peripheral states (Rampton and Nadarajah 2010); and, secondly, how 
international interventions – for security, development and peace – turned on liberal 
assumptions of, for example, a multi-ethnic majority desirous of liberal rule, the 
undue influence of ‘extremists on both sides’, and the centrality of underdevelopment 
to antagonisms. 
 
However, this reading of Sri Lanka’s politics and conflict, and the possibilities of 
liberal peace, is sharply at odds with the country’s post-independence history. A 
substantial scholarly literature – largely ignored or discounted by policy-informing 
research – emphasises the significance of the swift ascendance after independence of 
a Sinhala nationalist and majoritarian state transformation project, and its generation, 
long before armed conflict, of Tamil resistance in the form of demands for federal 
autonomy and later independent statehood (e.g., Bose, 1994; Krishna, 1999; Wilson, 
2000). By the seventies the state had already ‘regressed to an illiberal, ethnocentric 
regime bent on Sinhala super-ordination and Tamil subjugation’ (De Votta 2004:6). 
Tamils were marginalised from public service, the military and university access, and 
the electoral map altered to ensure permanent Sinhala dominance of government. 
Widespread mass protests, civil disobedience and episodic negotiations between 
Tamil and Sinhala leaders failed to slow the consolidation of majoritarian nationalist 
rule and the pre-war decades were ‘punctuated by bouts of annihilatory violence’ 
against Tamils (Krishna 1999:67). Especially consequential was the state’s aggressive 
program of Sinhala colonisation of Tamil majority areas; having initially demanded 
power-sharing at the centre, Tamil leaders sought federal autonomy to preserve the 
demographic integrity of what was now conceptualised as the Tamil homeland. 
Following the adoption in 1972 of today’s Sinhala-Buddhist constitution, Tamil 
parties united to form the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) which called for the 
creation of an independent Tamil Eelam. The coalition swept the Tamil areas in the 
1977 elections which also brought a Sinhala nationalist, West-aligned government to 
power. 
 
What this sketch of Sri Lanka’s post-independence history shows is how long before 
the armed conflict began in 1983, rather than a multi-ethnic liberal society, the 
island’s inhabitants recognised themselves as antagonistic collectives – ‘nations’ – at 
clear odds over historic claims to the Northeast, the ‘right’ political character of the 
state, and so on. In other words, rather than being merely ethnic or cultural labels, as 
liberal peace agents have it, ‘Tamil’ and ‘Sinhala’ had become deeply political 
identities, which polarised further during the war. Following the worst anti-Tamil 
pogrom in July 1983, in which government actors played a central role (Bush 
2003:128-134), war erupted between Tamil militants and the overwhelmingly Sinhala 
military (on the Tamil armed struggle, see e.g., Bose, 1994; O’Duffy, 2007). Despite 
counter-insurgency being replete with massacres, rights abuses, mass displacement 
and humanitarian suffering, western states’ pursuit of a liberal ideal of Sri Lanka has 
ensured increasing support for the state’s struggle against ‘extremism’ and 
‘terrorism’. Whilst donor aid flowed throughout the war, in part as reward for the 
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state’s continued economic liberalisation since 1977 (e.g. Shastri, 2004), western 
support for counter-insurgency was initially covert, in deference to neighbouring 
India’s Cold War sensitivities (Bose 1994:136n). However from the mid nineties, 
international interventions became overt, forceful and explicitly geared towards the 
decisive defeat of the LTTE, talks on devolution with ‘moderate’ (i.e. non-
secessionist) Tamil parties, and economic and political liberalisation. 
 
However, in 2000 as battlefield stalemate emerged and the economy collapsed, the 
international community switched to urging internationally-mediated negotiations 
with the LTTE (for overviews of the peace process, see e.g., Nadarajah and 
Vimalarajah, 2008; Goodhand et al, 2011). When the government resisted, despite 
initially agreeing to Norwegian facilitation, Oslo’s diplomats facilitated secret talks 
between the LTTE and the main opposition. After the latter won the 2001 elections an 
internationally-supervised ceasefire and Norwegian-brokered talks followed. At the 
same time, the international community, led by the US, EU and Japan, adopted a raft 
of parallel strategies which defined the limits of ‘peace’: a united, liberal market 
democracy. Donors pledged billions of dollars in aid to the government which in turn 
put forward a far-reaching neoliberal reform agenda, the battle-worn military was 
reorganised and expanded (Blodgett 2004) – under the explicit logic of deterring the 
LTTE from return to war (e.g. Lunstead 2007), and pressure was maintained on the 
LTTE – e.g. through threats of further proscriptions and other sanctions – to both 
abandon secession and remain at the table, irrespective of progress. Yet from 2003 
the peace process began to fray amid acrimony over ceasefire breaches, and the 
government’s non-implementation of interim agreements. Despite this and its 
complicity in a murderous ‘shadow war’ between both sides’ intelligence services, 
the state received unqualified international support, which continued when the 
opposition returned to power in 2004. The violence escalated steadily and in 2006 the 
government, now headed by an avowedly Sinhala nationalist President, resumed all 
out offensives. Explicitly blaming the LTTE for the failure of the peace process, the 
international community again backed the military campaign, despite the heavy 
civilian casualties, widespread rights abuses and deepening humanitarian crisis, until 
the government declared victory in May 2009. 
 
We discuss post-war dynamics in Sri Lanka below. However, the above outline of 
post-Cold War international interventions serves two purposes. Firstly, it shows how 
liberalism in the world is anything but pacific: even as liberal governmentality 
advances its possibilities through high intensity war, it attributes the attendant 
atrocities and humanitarian crises to its illiberal implementation partners – the 
peripheral state and military – or their adversaries. Secondly, the above sets out the 
shifting context in Sri Lanka in which western states’ engagement with the Tamil 
diaspora unfolded. Connecting security practices in peripheral spaces with those in 
the core demonstrates the hybridity of liberal order. 
 
 
Conflict and diasporas: Governing representations and practices 
 
Amid post-Cold War efforts to expand the liberal core, new studies in the nineties 
soon produced various understandings of its primary obstacle, intra-state conflict. 
These varied from those based on ideas of ‘ancient hatreds’ and ‘new barbarisms’ to 
emphasis on the political economy of war zones (see overview in Mundy, 2011). The 
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most influential for international policy, and consequently significant for the analysis 
here, are works that prioritised the instrumental rationality of conflict – i.e. that 
violence is sustained by ‘greed over grievance’ (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004) - or 
linked these ‘new wars’ to the state collapse and ensuing anarchy impelled by 
globalisation (Kaldor, 2001). Based on economistic, rational-choice logics, these 
analyses, whilst subject to strong critique (e.g., Kalyvas, 2001; Cramer 2002), have 
been profoundly consequential in how international peace interventions have been 
designed, and how conflict actors’ responses have been understood. Crucially, 
inherent to these conceptions of conflict is also that of peace i.e. liberal peace. 
Although another set of equally heated debates have emerged over the content and 
promise of liberal peace (e.g., Paris, 2010; Cooper et al 2011), international practices 
to generate order turn on a vision of a stable territorial state governed by liberal 
democracy, market economics and the rule of law. These constitute a universal model 
held to both maintain peace within and between states and also offer a route to this. In 
other words, irrespective of the political and other specificities of the conflict in 
question, peace is to be attained the same way: on the one hand, ceasefire, dialogue 
and compromise agreement between conflict parties and, especially, accommodation 
between the various sections of the country’s society; and, on the other hand, liberal 
reform and transformation of state institutions. 
 
It is against this post-Cold War international framework for pursuing security (peace) 
in the periphery that western states began criminalising armed actors in distant 
warzones as terrorists – irrespective of whether these actors posed a direct threat to 
them. The US first codified this conceptual hostility in 1997 by publishing a list, 
regularly expanded, of designated (proscribed) Foreign Terrorist Organisations. 
Almost every major armed actor around the world was on it, including the LTTE, 
which was also on Britain’s equally comprehensive list published in February 2001 – 
seven months before 9/11. Leaving aside continuing debates over what constitutes 
terrorism, the policy salience of ‘terrorism’ is in international efforts to pursue liberal 
peace in conflict states. For example, in July 2001 the LTTE attacked Sri Lanka’s 
international airport in Colombo, also the military’s main airbase. The raid, which 
dominated news coverage around the world, destroyed or badly damaged thirteen 
aircraft, including five airliners of the national carrier, making it historically the 
largest attack on civilian aviation. Yet, when Canada, EU and UN first published lists 
of banned terrorist organisations after 9/11, the LTTE was notably absent. The 
exemption was linked to the LTTE’s participation from 2001 in the internationally 
backed, Norwegian-led peace process in Sri Lanka. Indeed, the EU and Canadian 
only banned the LTTE in 2006, after the Norwegian initiative had collapsed and 
coinciding with the start of Sri Lanka’s massive internationally supported military 
campaign which ultimately destroyed the LTTE in 2009. 
 
It is also through international policy and practices aimed at pacifying the conflict 
states that migrant communities in the West - Tamils, Kurds, Kosovars, and many 
others - come into security focus. They do so, moreover, in specific ways: i.e. in 
terms of how they undermine or contribute to liberal peace in their home states. 
Whilst many ‘conflict-generated’ diaspora, such as the Tamils, have been growing in 
Western states for many decades, they became the subject of substantive scholarly 
and policy-related inquiry on conflict in the post-Cold War era. They did so, 
moreover, in ways succinctly captured in the title of a recent review of the field by 
one of its leading scholars: Diasporas and conflict societies: conflict entrepreneurs, 
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competing interests or contributors to stability and development? (Brinkerhoff, 
2011). The review outlines the literature’s focus on diasporas’ ‘motivations for 
engagement’ in their places of origin, and their ‘specific potential positive and 
negative impacts in societies experiencing or recovering from conflict.’ Setting out an 
explicit rational choice analysis and mapping of diasporas’ potential positive and 
negative influences, the paper lays out ‘why a more nuanced understanding of 
diasporas and peace and conflict is so important to policy and practice for a more 
peaceful world’ (Brinkerhoff, 2011:116-7; emphases added). The ontological and 
epistemological continuities between these mainstream studies of diaspora agency 
and the new wars literature are clear and sometimes explicit (e.g., Bigombe et al, 
2000:333-5; Demmers, 2007. On the ‘diaspora-conflict-peace-nexus’ see 
Pirkkalainen and Abdile, 2009).  
 
This problem-solving literature works with taken-for-granted conceptions of conflict 
and peace inherent to the global liberal project. In this sense diasporas are posited as 
externalities to the conflict (state) whose ‘influences’ are to be understood in terms of 
whether they lend themselves to generating disorder (‘warmongers’) or order 
(‘peacebuilders’) in their home states. In policy terms, this directly shapes the 
possibilities, limits and terms of international engagement with diasporas: expatriate 
warmongers need to be constrained and disciplined through surveillance, policing and 
immigration, while peacebuilders need to be encouraged, assisted and mobilised – for 
example, through development vehicles. With even ‘nationalist and factional 
interests’ in the diaspora held to have the potential to contribute to reconstruction and 
development and not just conflict (Brinkerhoff 2011:116), international engagement 
is exhorted to be cognisant of the ‘political opportunity structures’ shaping diasporas’ 
agency (Weyland 2004). Whilst warmongers and peacebuilders are conceivably to be 
found both within the conflict society and its diaspora(s), the rationalist cost-benefit 
logic informing research and policy practice adds a crucial edge to the positioning of 
the latter as externalities to the conflict state: unlike their counterpart communities at 
home, diasporas are deemed to have less to lose from the conflicts they stoke, to be 
more wedded to nationalist ‘dreams’ (sometimes by virtue of the inability to ‘fit’ into 
western societies), or even to need a blazing homeland to justify continued refugee 
status.  
 
Significantly, the pursuit of liberal peace engenders a normative dichotomy based on 
violence. On the one side, to be assisted, supported and encouraged, are those 
prepared to work non-violently towards an inclusive and pluralist future for the home 
country. On the other side are those seeking alternate - exclusivist, particularist and 
separatist – outcomes, sometimes through violence. The latter constitute the primary 
enemies of liberal peace who, if they cannot be persuaded or coerced into joining and 
working towards the project, must be confronted, marginalised and, if need be, 
destroyed. Crucially, the liberal peace places the territorial state, central to its 
advance, in the former category. This is not to deny that the state may be engaged in 
discrimination, exclusion and even violent repression; what matters is that it is 
amenable to future liberal reform and transformation. Conversely, the state’s armed 
challengers are placed in the latter category: the capacity for liberal democracy and 
market economies to address any and all grievances means there is no room for 
continuing ‘wars of national liberation’ or armed ‘freedom struggles’ – even in cases 
of state repression. Thus, it is actors’ relationship to violence (be they perpetrators, 
supporters or opponents) and how they respond to international interventions - i.e., 
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will they disarm and either disband or join the state reform/building project - that 
decides their location on the frontline of liberal peace. Similarly, and just as 
importantly, the politics of local actors and constituencies are categorised in relation 
to their fit with an inclusive, pluralist vision of the country. There is no (longer) room 
here, for example, for pursuit of ‘self-determination’ involving division of territorial 
rule along ethnic (i.e. exclusivist) lines. In these ways, the possibilities of local 
agency are redefined and sharply circumscribed by the project to universalise 
individual freedom. 
 
This has immediate consequences for diaspora agency. For example, while it is 
widely claimed that diaspora communities are well positioned to lobby host 
governments and other international actors, the above logic dictates whose arguments, 
aspirations, and claims should be taken seriously and whose should be ignored or 
rejected. Proponents of ‘freedom struggles’ and advocates of self-determination and 
independent statehood, or even (exclusive) ‘group’ rights more generally, become, by 
definition, warmongers, extremists, and nationalists (in the derogatory sense) to be 
viewed with suspicion, watched and policed, and marginalised from policy 
formulation. Conversely, those advocating non-violence, accommodation and 
pluralism, reconciliation, democratic outcomes and protection of individual (human) 
rights are to be supported, encouraged and inducted into the formulation and 
execution of international engagement with their home states. Moreover, since most 
people are assumed to aspire to a liberal way of life, a scarcity of moderate actors 
makes for specific inferences about the diaspora in question: either the pro-peace 
majority are being silenced - e.g. crowded out or intimidated by nationalists or 
insurgent agents who have ‘penetrated’ the diaspora (e.g., Weyland 2004) - or the 
diaspora as a whole is hardline. Amid its continuing advocacy of self-determination 
and independent statehood, explanations of Tamil diaspora dynamics have now 
shifted from the former to the latter (see representative discussions in Human Rights 
Watch, 2006 and International Crisis Group, 2010). 
 
 
The Tamil diaspora and the liberal peace: The shifting conditions of local agency 
 
The Tamil diaspora of an estimated million people is concentrated in Canada, Britain, 
Australia, Switzerland, France, Germany, Norway and other European states. It is 
now widely accepted in international discourse that ‘the diaspora’ has an important 
and legitimate role in Sri Lanka’s politics. However, this is a strikingly recent 
development. Certainly, expatriate Tamils are highly mobilised today and several 
major organisations are visibly active, lobbying host governments and opposition 
parties, international NGOs, UN bodies and so on (e.g., Vimalarajah and Cheran, 
2010). However, what is new is not diaspora activism per se, but how the 
international community is responding to it. As the diaspora grew through waves of 
refugee flight, its political activity was at first largely ignored, and then increasingly 
subject to coercive security regimes – proscription, policing and immigration. It is 
only since the end of the war that leading diaspora actors have been able to access the 
policy spaces of liberal peace and become part of international engagement with Sri 
Lanka’s crisis. This section sets out the changing nature of relations between the 
international community and the Tamil diaspora, and shows how the limits of 
diaspora agency have been determined to a great extent by international relations with 
Sri Lanka – i.e. rather than, as might be assumed, the other way round. 
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Although some Tamils emigrated to the West in the sixties and seventies, it was after 
the anti-Tamil pogrom and outbreak of armed conflict in 1983 that large numbers 
began arriving to claim asylum (e.g. International Crisis Group, 2010:2-4). Until the 
mid-nineties, expatriate Tamils did not figure prominently on western domestic 
security agendas, except in terms of varying immigration regimes. Neither did the 
LTTE, despite western military support for Sri Lanka; indeed, it is notable that, along 
with other armed movements, the LTTE located its International Secretariat in 
London from which it conducted diplomacy, propaganda and fundraising until the 
UK ban in 2001 (e.g. Orjuella, 2012:102-3). Tamil expatriates were largely free to 
pursue political activities, including advocacy and fund raising on behalf of the 
LTTE. However, this changed from the mid nineties when the international 
community began to intervene more actively to pursue liberal peace in Sri Lanka. 
Condemnation of the LTTE, its violence and ‘extremism’ (i.e. secessionism) became 
routine, and host governments’ attitudes towards Tamils supportive of the LTTE and 
Tamil Eelam (self-determination) hardened.  
 
The discursive separation between the LTTE and ‘the Tamils’ inherent to liberal 
peace interventions in Sri Lanka also encompassed diaspora actors i.e. as either 
‘supporters’ or ‘opponents’ of the LTTE, and as either ‘extremists’ (i.e. advocating 
self-determination) or ‘moderates’ (i.e. seeking a united, liberal Sri Lanka). As this 
reading became dominant in policy, popular and scholarly discourses, Tamils 
campaigning in support of self-determination met with scepticism, suspicion and 
hostility from host governments, media, NGOs and so on - the most credible Tamil 
voices were held to be those who criticised the LTTE and rejected separatism.2 Thus, 
although the majority of expatriates were those supporting Tamil Eelam (e.g. 
Vimalarajah and Cheran, 2010:22-3; International Crisis Group, 2010:i; Orjuella, 
2012:103-4,116), as has become evident since the war’s end (see below), their 
opponents were given greater credence. It also became commonsensical that the 
scarcity of such ‘moderate’ Tamil voices was due to intimidation and suppression of 
dissent by the LTTE and its supporters (e.g. Wayland, 2004), and that the majority of 
Tamils were silent supporters of peace in a united Sri Lanka (for a detailed and 
critical discussion of these dynamics, see Vimalarajah and Cheran, 2010). With 
proscription of the LTTE, this alignment between the two mappings – 
separatist/moderate and LTTE supporter/opponent - had more profound consequences 
for diaspora agency: to support Tamil Eelam now was by implication to support 
terrorism, and risk the attention of host states’ terrifying security apparatuses. 
 
Thus, as international interventions for liberal peace expanded in Sri Lanka, security 
practices at home began to impact more forcefully on diaspora activity (e.g., 
Nadarajah, 2009). Whilst there had always been monitoring of Tamil diaspora actors, 
especially the LTTE, surveillance increased from the mid-nineties, becoming acute 
after the ‘war on terror’ began. Meanwhile, it became harder to secure police 
permission for public events advocating for, or identifying with, Tamil Eelam, 
                                                 
2 This dichotomy also informed immigration regimes: whilst western governments have routinely 
sought to reject asylum claims and deport applicants, the grounds for rejection changed. In the 1980s 
association with the LTTE was accepted as grounds for fearing persecution in Sri Lanka. However in 
the late 1990s these increasingly become reasons for rejecting asylum claims; claims citing fear of the 
LTTE were also successful. Western states also sometimes denied visas to ‘hardline’ Tamil politicians 
or, having granted visas, detained and questioned them on arrival. 
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especially after the US and UK banned the LTTE. In Britain, it became routine for 
Tamils, unlike other citizens, when organising rallies or demonstrations to have to 
meet with police to demonstrate how these would not be ‘glorifying’ terrorism – to 
use a term in the anti-terror legislation. Disciplinary constraints were also applied 
outside legal frameworks – such as covert police advice for venues not to host some 
events (e.g. diaspora sports competitions for ‘Eelam’ cups), charity commissions’ 
more careful scrutiny of Tamil accounts, and broadcasting authorities’ readiness to 
take seriously (anonymous) complaints against Tamil diaspora media reporting. 
 
However, strikingly, it was many years before proscriptions resulted in arrests and 
charges under anti-terrorism legislation. This hiatus was arguably related to the 
Norwegian-led peace process: Sri Lanka’s resumption of military operations against 
the LTTE in 2006 was preceded by further proscriptions (by Canada and the EU) and 
followed in several western states by high profile arrests, as well as periodic searches 
of some Tamil businesses and activists’ homes - actions clearly intended as signals of 
support for Sri Lanka and to increase pressure on the LTTE and those supporting it or 
Tamil Eelam. While arrests, sometimes by armed police, generated international 
media coverage and spread fear and insecurity amongst Tamil expatriates, most cases 
were subsequently dropped and a tiny handful resulted in convictions. Crucially, the 
new proscriptions were accompanied by a specific discursive framing: Tamil citizens, 
it was held, needed to be protected from LTTE intimidation (e.g. Human Rights 
Watch, 2006). This policy-driving logic soon became dominant, even as it overlooked 
well-known Tamil practices – e.g. during the peace process thousands of expatriates 
travelled to LTTE-held areas to volunteer for humanitarian and developmental work, 
especially after the 2004 tsunami (e.g. Vimalarajah and Cheran, 2010:17); 
mainstream Tamil parties in Sri Lanka won elections in 2001 and 2004 on platforms 
endorsing the LTTE; and tens of thousands of expatriates routinely attended rallies 
supporting the LTTE or annual commemorations of its war dead (e.g. Orjuella, 
2012:103). 
 
These security practices exemplify the hybridity of both liberalism and diasporas. On 
the one hand, western security regimes articulate expatriate Tamils as liberal and 
peaceable citizens whose freedoms need protection from the martial LTTE; on the 
other hand, they work through a ‘categorical suspicion’ (Marx, 1988) of diaspora 
members as existential threats to liberal peace in Sri Lanka to be disciplined and 
policed through measures liberalism routinely condemns elsewhere as political 
repression. Diaspora identity reflects a similar contradiction. While expatriates adopt 
quintessentially liberal methods of political advocacy – rallies, petitions, referenda, 
lobbying of ‘their’ elected representatives, and so on – these practices are fretfully 
self-regulated to avoid, firstly, falling foul of anti-terrorism legislation, and, secondly, 
being dismissed as ‘extremists’, ‘ethno-nationalists’ or ‘separatists’. As such, even as 
they exercise their rights as western citizens, expatriate Tamils must also work to be 
recognised as good subjects of liberal peace. 
 
International engagement with the Tamil diaspora underwent a dramatic change from 
2009 (e.g. Vimalarajah and Cheran, 2010:6; Orjuella 2012:93), underlining once 
more not only the integral relations between liberal and non-liberal worlds but also 
the dependence of the possibilities for diaspora agency on the relations between host 
and home states. Firstly, the mass killings of tens of thousands of Tamil civilians in 
the final months of the war (United Nations, 2011) triggered an unprecedented wave 
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of diaspora mobilisation and protest in several capitals. In Britain, thousands 
occupied the square outside parliament in mid-March and protested continuously for 
72 days until the war ended in May, and in a staggering show of anger and strength, 
over 100,000 people marched on April 11 (BBC, 2009). The tenor of the protests, as 
underlined by the banners, chants and thousands of Tamil Eelam flags, was clearly in 
support of the LTTE and independence. At the same time, relations between the 
West-led international community and the Sri Lankan state deteriorated as the latter 
pointedly retreated from liberal peace. The state’s conduct after the war also led to a 
convergence of international and Tamil demands: the release and resettlement of 
hundreds of thousands of Tamils who survived the cataclysmic final months to be 
interned in militarised camps; an independent investigation of, and accountability for, 
the war crimes and crimes against humanity; demilitarisation of Tamil areas; and 
negotiating a political solution with Tamil leaders. This convergence was given 
further impetus by the state’s belligerent rejection of these demands. Riding a wave of 
Sinhala triumphalism, the state also adopted a further string of domestic policies 
antithetical to both Tamil interests and the liberal peace, including renewed Sinhala 
colonisation of Tamil areas, the use of paramilitary terror to stifle political agitation, 
and military control of resettlement and development. 
 
At the same time, the destruction of the LTTE radically changed the conditions of 
diaspora activism (Vimalarajah and Cheran, 2010:5-6; Orjuella 2012:105-6). 
Supporting Tamil Eelam, whilst still criticised as an extreme position, could no longer 
be equated to supporting terrorism and, openly expressed in mass protests and a series 
of diaspora-organised referenda in 2009-10 (Vimalarajah and Cheran, 2010:22), 
could no longer be dismissed as a peculiarity of the LTTE or a minority. In contrast to 
the earlier framing of expatriate Tamils as being terrorised and silenced by the LTTE, 
and in the absence of significant ‘moderate’ mobilisation, ‘the diaspora’ as a whole is 
held to be hardline (e.g. International Crisis Group, 2010). However, as of this writing 
(June 2012) this contradiction has not been foregrounded in the international 
community’s engagement with the diaspora, including many actors once avoided as 
‘pro-LTTE’. The point here is that it is precisely in its post-war efforts to secure 
liberal peace in Sri Lanka that liberal governmentality has come into direct 
confrontation with Sinhala nationalism, and international actors are finding common 




Conclusion: Hybrid practices, hybrid subjects 
 
This article made two arguments. First, we showed how liberalism, as a specific form 
of governmental reason and practice produced at the intersection of the European and 
non-European worlds, has always been hybrid, encompassing within its project both 
‘liberal’ and ‘non-liberal’ spaces, practices and subjects. Second, through analysis of 
liberal engagement with the Tamil diaspora, we showed how practices of 
transnational security governance work to reproduce the hybridity of liberal peace. 
Locating the Tamil diaspora in its multiple relations with the pursuit of liberal peace 
in Sri Lanka, the article demonstrated how this project determines, to a significant 
part, the conditions for local agency in relations and practices that call into question 
the simple dualism between the liberal and the non-liberal. Furthermore, we also 
showed how transnational security practices act on and through diasporas to advance 
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a globe-spanning transformative project of generating pacific liberal order, in the 
process reproducing diasporas as also hybrid. It is worth noting here that the hybridity 
of liberal order makes possible the very resistances the project seeks to overcome. In 
the case of the Tamils, as in many others, it has long been forgotten that their 
challenge to the global liberal project is staged on a quintessential liberal basis: self-
determination. In sum, then, the article shows how it is in positing a division of the 
world between order and disorder, equating the former with its tenets, and arrogating 
to itself a mission to transform the latter into its semblance, that a hybrid liberalism 
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